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The limits of Type D coercive diplomacy in Somalia

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THESIS

THE LIMITS OF TYPE D COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA

by

John C. Harrison

December, 1995

Thesis Advisor:

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THE LIMITS OF TYPE D COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the U.S./U.N. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 represents an attempt to use coercive diplomacy to re-create the Somali state. It further argues that the pre-conditions for a successful use of coercive diplomacy existed initially during the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) phase, but they quickly disappeared during the expanded mission of United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

This thesis proposes that UNITAF leadership were quite successful in accomplishing their limited objectives. Additionally, when UNOSOM II assumed the mission in Somalia, the expanded mandates and policies chosen by both the U.S. and the U.N. changed the conditions for success and led the UNOSOM II forces to war with members of the Somali militia.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. A COERCIVE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY	5
A. PRE-CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS	7
B. DEFINITIONS	9
III. TOWARD A COERCIVE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY	11
A. THE U.S. AS POLICY-MAKER IN SOMALIA	11
B. RECREATING THE SOMALI STATE BY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY	17
1. Recreating the State	24
IV. ANALYSIS	31
A. USABLE MILITARY OPTIONS	31
B. ASYMMETRY OF MOTIVATION	35
1. Mission Creep And Asymmetry of Motivation	37
C. BASIS FOR DIPLOMACY	40
1. A Two-track Strategy	46
D. CLARITY OF AMERICAN AND UN OBJECTIVES	48
E. DOMESTIC SUPPORT	55
V. CONCLUSION	61
A. POLICY CREATION	63
APPENDIX.	65

LIST OF REFERENCES	67
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	71

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The world community has experienced a plethora of failed states since the end of the Cold War. Cold War diplomatic and military solutions for handling crisis situations do not necessarily apply to non-state actors in these former states. The United Nations and the United States, along with the rest of the world, are finding it increasingly difficult to locate solutions to these complex problems.

Analysis of the United Nations intervention in Somalia provides insight into the problems involved in restructuring a state that has fallen into anarchy. The motivation to defend against the expansion of Communism no longer drives the policy makers in either the U.N. or the U.S. Humanitarian intervention coupled with communal conflict mediation may create different problems than policy makers have become accustomed to.

Alexander George has conducted extensive analysis of state to state conflicts when the U.S. has chosen a policy option that he calls *coercive diplomacy*. Coercive diplomacy can be an attractive strategy to policy makers because it theoretically offers the country a chance to achieve aims with less cost in blood and treasure than a more conventional military approach. Therefore, if force is used at all, it is not part of a conventional military strategy that seeks to destroy the enemy's military forces or their support base. Force must be a component of a more complex political-diplomatic strategy for resolving a conflict of interests, which is why coercive diplomacy is an

His analysis has identified eight pre-conditions that must be present for coercive diplomacy to have a strong likelihood of success. Those eight are:

1. Strength of United States motivation
2. Asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States
3. Clarity of American Objectives
4. Sense of urgency to achieve the American objective
5. Adequate domestic political support
6. Usable military options
7. Opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation
8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement

The methodology for this study merges George's pre-conditions for simplicity's sake as follows:

1. Usable Military Options
2. Asymmetry of Motivation favoring the United States
3. A basis for diplomacy
4. Clarity of American Objective
5. Adequate Domestic Support

What were the goals of the United States and the United Nations in Somalia? What were the strategies and how were they implemented? What were the limitations that were inherent in these operations and were they recognized? These are some of the important questions about the U.S. role in

Somalia. The United States (while supporting the United Nations objectives implicitly in some cases and explicitly in others) embarked on what amounted to a strategy of coercive diplomacy in order to recreate the Somali state. The coercive diplomacy strategy was directed at the various faction leaders in Somalia but was especially targeted toward the leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Muhammad Farrah Aideed. The failure of this strategy during UNOSOM II eventually led the U.S. and the U.N. into open warfare against militia members loyal to Aideed.

This thesis will argue that conditions for successful use of coercive diplomacy existed or were created in Somalia during the United Task Force (UNITAF) phase of operations in Somalia. Additionally, it will explore how and why those conditions quickly evaporated when the U.S. supported the more difficult goals established by United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

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JCH

I. INTRODUCTION

"All in all the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the cold war and to be a more junglelike world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities."

Samuel P. Huntington

The United States experience in Somalia from December, 1992 until the pullout of combat troops in March, 1994 led to divisive debates over the role of the United States in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian intervention.¹ Some argue that the US paid a small price in blood and treasure in Somalia to learn, once again, to never become involved in foreign internal conflicts.² Others argue that wrongly applying the United States (U.S.) and United Nations (U.N.) experience in Somalia as a model of failure will keep the United States from intervening when there *are* clear vital national security or humanitarian interests.³ Still others point to the success that UNITAF achieved from December 1992 - May 1993 in saving thousands from starvation.⁴ There is little debate however that the United States and the United Nations suffered a loss

¹A search of congressional records since June of 1993 shows a marked increase in Congressional leaders using the US and UN failed effort in Somalia as proof that the US has no interests in resolving domestic political disputes of foreign countries. During this time, the US was debating whether to intervene in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Haiti.

²For this view see Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, Autumn 1994; and "The Road to Hell...A Critique of Humanitarian Intervention," *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1993. See also David Rieff, "The Illusions of Peacekeeping," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1994.

³For this view see, see the following editorials, "The Future of U.N. Peacekeeping," *New York Times*, 12 January, 1995, p. A24; "The Future of Peace-Keeping", *The Washington Post*, 8 January, 1995, p. C6.

⁴For this view see John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restored Hope*, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace, 1995; Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters*, Vol XXIII, #4, Winter 1993-94; and Colonel Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1995.

of prestige and self-confidence over the outcome, and that their intended target, the "Warlord" Aideed, is now more powerful than ever.⁵

Because this unprecedented effort of post-cold war intervention in domestic conflict turned out as it did, it is important to learn from both the successes and failures.⁶ The current administration has completed an analysis of U.S. participation in United Nations Chapter VI and VII interventions and established new priorities and procedures as laid out in Presidential Decision Directive 25.⁷ There is also little doubt that this analysis and subsequent change of policy was inspired partly by the problems experienced in Somalia.

Examining the evolution of U.S. policy in Somalia is important because of the difficulty that traditional state systems have when attempting to apply traditional military and political strategies to non-state actors. The Somalia case offers an opportunity to look at the diplomatic and military solutions attempted by the U.N. and the U.S. through several different lenses. The lens applied in this study may shed light on the problems experienced with the increasing numbers of failed and collapsing states.

What were the goals of the United States and the United Nations in Somalia? What were the strategies and how were they implemented? What

⁵Smith Hempstone, "Avoiding Future Somalias," *VFW Magazine*, February, 1994, p. 30.

⁶Colonel Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1995, p.xvii.

⁷Department of Defense Memorandum for Correspondents on Peace Operations Directive," May 5, 1994. This document lays out the high points of the classified Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which outlines U.S. policy on participating and reforming multi-lateral peace operations. The document was released to the press with comments by Secretary of Defense Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili.

were the limitations that were inherent to these operations and were they recognized? These are some of the important questions about the U.S. role in Somalia. The United States (while supporting the United Nations objectives implicitly in some cases and explicitly in others) embarked on what amounted to a strategy of coercive diplomacy in order to recreate the Somali state. The coercive diplomacy strategy was directed at the various faction leaders in Somalia but was especially targeted toward the leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Muhammad Farrah Aideed. The failure of this strategy during UNOSOM II eventually led the U.S. and the U.N. into open warfare against militia members loyal to Aideed.⁸

This thesis will argue that conditions for successful the use of coercive diplomacy existed or were created in Somalia during the United Task Force (UNITAF) phase of operations in Somalia. Additionally, it will demonstrate how the conditions that existed during the U.S. humanitarian mission of UNITAF, quickly evaporated when the U.S. supported the much more difficult goals established by United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).⁹

⁸James L. Woods, "U.S. Government Decision-Making Processes During Humanitarian Operations In Somalia", Paper presented at Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited", April 21-22, 1995, p. 19. James Woods served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs from December 1986 to April 1994. In that position he served as Chairman of the OSD Somalia Task Force and as a member of various interagency groups organized to deal with the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Woods (among many others) points out that the violent combat operations that erupted after the 5 June ambush, was the turning point for the intervention. With the passing of resolution 837, the U.N. was for all intents and purposes at war.

⁹The U.S. led humanitarian effort in December, 1992 is generally thought of as successful. The U.S. mission established objectives of stopping the starvation of thousands of Somali people. The U.S. turned the mission over to the United Nations (UNOSOM) in May of 1993 but left U.S. forces to provide a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and logistics troops. Some critics of the UNITAF mission such as Walter Clarke, believe that UNITAF did not accomplish enough to ensure UNOSOM II could succeed.

The inherent difficulties of using coercion to achieve diplomatic goals are pointed out by Alexander George in the 1971 book, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*.¹⁰ This thesis analyzes U.S. policy in Somalia using a modification of the original George pre-conditions for success to show why the U.S. and the U.N. failed in its attempt to recreate the Somali state.

¹⁰Alexander George, David K. Hall & William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 211-252.

II. A COERCIVE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

Coercive diplomacy is generally intended to "back a demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand".¹¹ George further defines the strategy as defensive rather than offensive, though it may encompass the use of exemplary military force in order to show an adversary your willingness to use force if necessary. This exemplary force "must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, it is employed in...the form of a quite limited military action, to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary."¹²

Coercive diplomacy can be an attractive strategy to policy makers because it theoretically offers the country a chance to achieve aims with less cost in blood and treasure than a more conventional military approach. Therefore, if force is used at all, it is not part of a conventional military strategy that seeks to destroy the enemy's military forces or their support base. Force must be a component of a more complex political-diplomatic strategy for resolving a conflict of interests, which is why coercive diplomacy is an appropriate description. "Coercive diplomacy seeks to make force a much more

¹¹Alexander A. George & William E. Simons, (ed.), *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Second Edition*, Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 2.

¹²George & Simons, p. 2.

flexible, refined psychological instrument of policy in contrast to the "quick, decisive" military strategy, which uses force as a blunt instrument."¹³

Alexander George identifies two types (A & B) or uses for coercive diplomacy and differentiates them from deterrence.¹⁴

DETERRENCE: Persuade opponent not to initiate an action

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Type A

persuade opponent to
stop short of goal

Type B

persuade opponent
to undo his action

George also argues that diplomacy becomes progressively more difficult in terms of pressure on an aggressor necessary to achieve the desired effect as you move from a deterrence strategy through Type A to a Type B coercive diplomacy strategy.¹⁵ The reasons for this are obvious, "the more ambitious the demand on the opponent, the more difficult the task of coercive diplomacy becomes."¹⁶

U.S. diplomatic efforts after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 offers an example of both Type A and B coercive diplomacy. Assuming that Saddam Hussein intended to continue his attack into Saudi Arabia, the U.S. successfully

¹³George & Simons, pp. 9-11.

¹⁴George, Hall & Simons, p. 24.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 8.

used Type A coercive diplomacy to persuade him to stop short of that goal. The subsequent use of Type B coercive diplomacy to force Iraq from Kuwait was unsuccessful and led to what we now call the Persian Gulf War.

A. PRE-CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

George identified eight pre-conditions that must be present for coercive diplomacy to have a strong likelihood of success.¹⁷ Those are:

1. Strength of United States motivation
2. Asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States
3. Clarity of American Objectives
4. Sense of urgency to achieve the American objective
5. Adequate domestic political support
6. Usable military options
7. Opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation
8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement

Bruce Jentleson, in the second edition of *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, identified a third type or use for coercive diplomacy; *induce a change in the composition of the adversary's government*. He further theorizes that this objective is even more difficult than the objective underlying George's Type B. Jentleson used a modified form of the original eight pre-conditions to

¹⁷George, Hall & Simons, p. 216.

analyze U.S. policy toward Nicaragua during the Reagan administration.¹⁸ His framework is included:

1. Usable Military Options
2. A favorable asymmetry of Motivation
3. A basis for diplomacy
4. International Legitimacy
5. Adequate Domestic Support

Jentleson's essay on Nicaragua inspired the premise for this thesis and for that reason it is mentioned here.

Because of the post-Cold War phenomenon of many rapidly failing and break-away states, decision makers may have a new use for the strategy of coercive diplomacy. The United Nations fully supported (and sometimes directed) by the United States, demonstrated a Type D variant of coercive diplomacy, in which the objective was to *recreate a government where one no longer existed*. The methodology for this study is another modified version of George's original pre-conditions and is shown with respect to how they apply to his original pre-conditions:

1. Usable Military Options (#6)
2. Asymmetry of Motivation favoring the United States (#1 & #2)

¹⁸Bruce Jentleson, "The Reagan Administration Versus Nicaragua: The Limits of "Type C" Coercive Diplomacy," in Alexander George & William E. Simons (ed.), *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Second Edition*, Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 176.

3. A basis for diplomacy (#7 & #8)
4. Clarity of American Objective (#3 & #4)
5. Adequate Domestic Support (#5)

As shown, I have merged some of George's pre-conditions for simplicity.

By analyzing these pre-conditions with respect to Somalia, this study will explain why the United States did not succeed in recreating the Somali state using a coercive diplomacy strategy.

B. DEFINITIONS

In order to understand the Somali political climate in the post-state period it is important to briefly discuss the role of clans, factions, militias, and power. These elements were important to the decision making processes of the United Nations, United States and Somali leaders.

The line between factions and clans became blurred in Somalia. Suffice it to say that factions were clan based. That is, the members of factions were of the same clan, but not all clan members were in a single faction.¹⁹ For the purposes of this study, a faction or militia can be defined as a military/political group headed by what most western politicians and media delighted in calling "warlords." These "warlords" were essentially former military commanders that either fought for or against the Siad Barre regime during the civil war in 1991. More importantly, the "warlords" controlled power, especially in Mogadishu.

¹⁹Keith Richburg, "Relations With the Warlords and Disarmament," Paper presented at Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995, p. 2.

Power in Mogadishu prior to the U.S. humanitarian intervention meant control of food that entered the country via the ports of Mogadishu. Power after the U.S. led intervention was measured in terms of perceptions. Perceptions of the extent to which the "warlords" could provide for their faction's well being after what the population believed would be the inevitable departure of the U.S. and the U.N.

Because of the complex nature of the situation in Somalia and the relative difficulty that the U.S. and the U.N. had with Mogadishu, this paper focuses primarily on the capital of Somalia: Mogadishu. Mogadishu is the 20th century center of Somali politics, economics, transportation and culture. For these reasons it was the most fought over by the rival factions and therefore the most troublesome spot for the U.N. and U.S. intervention forces.

As defined, coercive diplomacy can be very attractive to policy makers because of its relative low costs and inherent flexibility. Did the U.S. and U.N. choose coercion in order to meet their objective to recreate the Somali state? The next chapter answers those questions and asserts that the U.S. was primarily responsible for both the goals and strategies during the U.S. and U.N. intervention into Somalia.

III. TOWARD A COERCIVE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

Before the coercive diplomacy framework can be applied to the Somalia case, three things must be established:

1. The U.S. was *de facto* in charge of the strategy applied during both UNITAF and UNOSOM II.
2. The U.S. and the U.N. did attempt a coercive diplomacy strategy to meet their objective.
3. The U.S. and the U.N. did attempt to recreate the Somali state.

A. THE U.S. AS POLICY-MAKER IN SOMALIA

When the media-induced public cry for humanitarian relief in Somalia reached a crescendo in November 1992, President Bush announced plans to relieve the starving population and to have the troops home by President-elect Clinton's inauguration day. From that moment on there was little doubt within the confines of the Washington inner circle about who was in charge of the operation. The U.S. was deeply involved in the wording of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 which authorized the U.S. deployment to "create a secure environment."²⁰ U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) carefully crafted their mission statement so as not to become involved in so called "nation-building." The subsequent US-led UNITAF deployment placed some

²⁰Walter Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates in Somalia," Draft Paper presented at Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited", April 21-22, 1995, Appendix-2.

38,000 troops on the ground (25,426 U.S.) by January 1992. Former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley led the diplomatic effort for the U.S. as Special Envoy. U.S. forces arrived in Mogadishu in December, 1992 with overwhelming force and initially only met "armies" of cameramen on the beaches.

As the mission progressed through December it was heralded as a tremendous success for the U.S. and as an important precedent for future military interventions to deal with humanitarian disasters.²¹ The Bush administration and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had negotiated for the U.S. to turn over the mission to a UN-led force as soon as the situation was acceptable. But there appeared to be a test of wills between President Bush and the Secretary General. Bush was adamant that the U.S. would not become overtly involved in "nation-building." Walter Clarke asserts that Boutros-Ghali believed that the U.S. initial commitment would inevitably lead them to embrace his "nation-building" agenda and commit the required U.S. forces.²²

In February, the newly inaugurated Clinton administration pressed Boutros-Ghali for a re-deployment date sooner rather than later. It was clear that the newly elected administration did not want to begin its term with a

²¹Jannie Botes, "An Exit Interview with Hank Cohen," *CSIS Africa Notes*, no. 147, April 1993, p. 7.

²²Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters*, Vol. XXIII, #4, Winter 1993-1994, p. 47. Walter Clarke served as the Deputy Director of the United States Liaison Office in Mogadishu from March to June 1993. It is important to note that it was during this time frame that most critics of UNOSOM II point to as the turning point from humanitarian relief to unsuccessful "nation-building".

commitment of such magnitude. Although Boutros-Ghali urged the U.S. to delay re-deployment until effective disarmament of the bandits and rival clan factions, the U.S. ignored the Secretary General's pleas and pressed ever harder for a turnover date. Boutros-Ghali was concerned that the turnover from a very capable U.S.-led force to a less capable U.N.-led force would cause insurmountable problems and destroy any hope for disarming the factions. Boutros-Ghali believed that disarmament of the Somali factions and gangs was necessary for reconciliation, and that without disarmament the mission could not be achieved.²³

Through further negotiations with Boutros-Ghali, the Clinton administration took three conciliatory actions in an attempt to assuage the Secretary General. These actions set the stage for continued U.S. presence and virtually ensured that the U.S. would become more embroiled than originally planned by the Bush administration. The first of these actions involved the appointment of retired U.S. Navy Admiral and former Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Howe as the U.N. Special Envoy and the U.S. approval of the UNOSOM II force commander. According to James Woods, "at the policy level, there was little disagreement between the US and the UN on what would be required,...The entire operation would be under the watchful gaze of an American, retired Admiral (and, more importantly, former Deputy National Security Advisor) Jon Howe...The Turkish General in command of UNOSOM

²³Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p. 16.

II, Cevik Bir, had been selected with the approval of the U.S."²⁴ With their man leading the U.N. effort, the Clinton administration was in a position to decisively influence the strategy.

Secondly, although the administration continued to stress to the American people a limited mission for U.S. troops, they voted for United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (UNSCR 814). UNSCR 814 was passed on 26 March 1993. The resolution authorized the establishment of UNOSOM II, the first ever peacekeeping operation under the Chapter VII enforcement provision of the U.N. Charter. The resolution called for the disarmament of the Somali clans, and explicitly endorsed the objective of rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of Somalia. The U.S. fully supported this mandate.²⁵

Meanwhile the Clinton administration attempted to spotlight the shrinking U.S. involvement by President Clinton personally welcoming the returning U.S. Marines from the UNITAF phase of the operation. But the U.S. had succumbed to the U.N. insistence that security and logistics operations could not be maintained in Mogadishu without help from the U.S. The U.S. left behind approximately 4,500 troops of which 1,500 made up the UNOSOM II Quick Reaction Force (QRF) while the remainder supplied logistics to the U.N. forces. This third concession to Boutros-Ghali made it mandatory that the U.S.

²⁴Woods, p. 17.

²⁵Allard, p. 18.

stay involved in policy, strategic and tactical planning. These forces would eventually become more and more involved in combat operations. Although their operations were *not* under the control of a UN commander as some critics have stated, they certainly embarked on more than the original mission of acting in response to emergency situations. With President Clinton's pre-election emphasis on multi-lateral intervention, the Somalia case provided the perfect opportunity to experiment with this seemingly new military option. The administration then quietly went about its business, hoping for the best without fully considering the military implications of the expanded mandate.

Indeed, at least one author familiar with the Somali case believes that U.S. high level decision making created many of the problems experienced by UNOSOM II. "In the end, though, unilateral American action in the guise of multilateral U.N. action only plunged the United Nations's esteem lower."²⁶

Even though Admiral Howe was acting in the capacity of a United Nations Special Envoy, there is little doubt that his orders were received directly from Washington. Howe points this out himself by stressing that military options for the UN were severely hampered by the U.S. insistence on approving military operations at the highest levels. He blames this for part of the failure to respond quickly to Aideed.²⁷

²⁶ Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu, Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1995, p. 139.

²⁷Jonathan T. Howe, "Relations Between the United States and the United Nations," Paper presented at Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited", April 21-22, 1995, pp. 4-23. On critics of U.N. policy within the Clinton administration Admiral Howe points out; "The nations are an integral part of the UN. When they criticize the UN for various actions, they often are, in effect, engaging in self-criticism. This is especially true of a country as influential as the United States."

On at least one occasion President Clinton went so far as to deny knowledge about the U.S. attempts to capture Aideed.²⁸ On the other hand, at a luncheon for journalists on July 2, 1993 the president told his guests that Aideed would "continue to cause problems until and unless we arrest him."²⁹ This uncertainty has raised doubts about whether President Clinton was involved in the decision to go after Aideed with Task Force Ranger. Elizabeth Drew points out that eventually President Clinton believed the hunt for Aideed was causing even more problems for UNOSOM II and believed that a more conciliatory approach should be undertaken. However, Drew maintains that no orders from the executive branch were issued to stop the hunt. Drew attributes this to confusion among the president's advisors and the Pentagon.

Why weren't the commanders in the field given new instructions? The answer was shrouded in ambiguity, if not outright confusion. Following the raid (03-04 October, 1993), and for a long time after that, Clinton angrily said to his aides that he thought such exercises had been terminated. But others--in their post facto explanations--said that no such decision [to terminate] had been made...The theory, according to [Anthony] Lake, was that the military and diplomatic pressure were complementary. 'The policy was never to stop trying to get Aideed,' Lake said. [Secretary of Defense] Aspin said afterward, 'The Pentagon's understanding of

²⁸"U.S. Military Operations In Somalia," *Hearings Before the Committee On Armed Services, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12, 21 May, 1994, S. HRG. 103-846*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 71. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, LTC (R) Larry Joyce (father of slain Ranger SGT Joyce) testified that he asked President Clinton "...if he (President Clinton) had already decided, in September, to seek a diplomatic solution with Aideed, why were the Rangers ordered on October 3 to conduct a raid that, by its very nature, would be the most dangerous mission yet?" LTC (R) Joyce further stated that President Clinton said "He (President Clinton) told me that was the key question and that he was as dismayed as I was that the raid had been launched. He said that when the reports began coming in on October 3, he asked his advisers, 'Why did they do that?'"

²⁹Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 243.

the policy was to move to more diplomatic efforts but snatch Aideed on the side, if you can.³⁰

This has become known as the "two-track strategy" and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter IV. Although confusing policies emanated from Washington, one thing was clear, the U.S. was calling the shots during both UNITAF and UNSOSOM II.

B. RECREATING THE SOMALI STATE BY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Did the U.S. embark on a strategy of coercive diplomacy in Somalia? Yes, but its coercive character may not have been fully understood. Coercive diplomacy is defined as a defensive strategy and only one of a number of tools that policy makers have available to achieve foreign policy goals.³¹ In the particular situation in Somalia there were several policy options open for the U.S. and the U.N. Invoking Chapter VI and then later Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter were forms of coercive diplomacy as differentiated from attempting offensive action against the factions in order to destroy their will to resist or to kill and capture their combatants. The limited military actions by the U.S. during UNITAF and initially in UNOSOM II reflect the coercive diplomacy concept established by George and then later Jentleson; "Costs are to be inflicted on the adversary, but these should be of a type and magnitude geared more toward influencing his decision than to physically imposing one's

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 323-324.

³¹George & Simons, pp. 7-10.

will upon him."³² Offensive action of the type that would force compliance on the people and militia leaders of Somalia would be tantamount to the creation of a U.N. protectorate. The recreation of the state would then be a military exercise in occupation with all the requisite functions of protectorship to include disarming of the militias.³³

U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley, makes it perfectly clear that the use of coercive diplomacy allowed him to induce compliance among the various faction leaders. In early December 1992 (prior to UNITAF forces arrival), Ambassador Oakley met with the two most powerful Somali faction leaders, Mohammed Farrah Aideed and Ali Mahdi, to enlist their cooperation in assuring the arrival of U.S. forces went unchallenged.³⁴ From the outset, Oakley made it clear that their cooperation was mandatory. "I asked both leaders to meet with General Johnston, Ambassador Ismat Kittani (the Special Representative of the Secretary General), and me on December 11 at the U.S. Liaison Office to discuss the potentially disastrous results if their followers unintentionally clashed with U.S. forces. I reminded them of the massive firepower that had been used so effectively during Desert Storm."³⁵ When I asked Ambassador Oakley how he got Aideed to the first meetings with

³²Jentleson, pp. 176.

³³ Stevenson, pp. 125-128. Stevenson offers a scenario of occupation that includes the disarming of the militias using overwhelming military force at the outset coupled with tough diplomatic efforts to induce the militia leaders to capitulate.

³⁴Oakley, Robert B., "An Envoy's Perspective," *Joint Forces Quarterly Forum*, Autumn 1993, p. 46.

³⁵Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," p 46.

Ali Mahdi and later meetings in Addis Ababa, he replied "I twisted his arm,"³⁶ but didn't elaborate further. Ambassador Oakley further stated that "As far as possible, our purpose would be achieved by dialogue and co-option, using implicit threats of coercion to buttress requests for cooperation among the factions and with UNITAF....Once the Somali leaders concluded an agreement...if no action was taken after a decent interval,...they (the leaders) should be ready to have UNITAF impose it on them, by force if necessary."³⁷

The supposed UN-led UNOSOM II operation by its very mandate was coercive as well. UNOSOM II was launched under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by UN Security Council Resolution 814.³⁸ Although the resolution called for the general disarmament of Somali factions, UNOSOM II, by their own admission lacked the military forces and talent to carry out this broad military objective.³⁹ Because of this lack of military might, the UNOSOM II leadership initially opted for the less inflammatory option of coercive diplomacy.

Admiral Howe paid a well-publicized call on Aideed on May 24 in the hopes of getting him to reach a last-minute accommodation for the conference. Aideed may have seen this as an act of UNOSOM weakness. It is evident in

³⁶Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, 20 March 1995 at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

³⁷Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," p. 47.

³⁸Allard, p. 19.

³⁹Howe, pp. 8-14.

retrospect that whatever limited compulsion he felt to cooperate up to that point, was now gone. By showing that he could dupe the UN, Aideed gained more support from within his own clan and support from other clans by portraying the UN as imperialist.⁴⁰ In that short time, Howe and UNOSOM II had lost the credibility to offer either a stick or a carrot to Aideed.

The U.N.'s loss of credibility was confirmed on June 5, 1993 when Pakistani forces were ambushed by Somali militia after searching a weapons cache. The subsequent battle caused the death of 24 Pakistanis and an unknown number of Somali militia and innocent bystanders. After June 5, the U.N. and U.S. entered a new phase of involvement in Somalia. No longer was coercive diplomacy considered an option. When Security Council Resolution 837 was signed the next day (June 6), the U.N. and the U.S. were at war with Aideed's faction.

The impact of the attack on the Pakistani forces can not be overstated. According to a report issued by a U.N. Commission of Inquiry, the events of June 5th plunged UNOSOM II into a peace enforcement role rather than a peacekeeping one.⁴¹

The events leading to the attack were precipitated by UNOSOM II policies that called for the inspection of authorized weapons storage sites

⁴⁰Ibid, p. 53.

⁴¹ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 1993 to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led To Casualties Among Them*, United Nations, New York, 24 February, 1994, p. 8. This report is the essential source for understanding the implications of the attack on the Pakistanis. According to Walter Clarke, the conclusions of this report were initially not published due to its criticism of U.N. and U.S. leadership.

(AWSS) controlled by the various militias. These weapons sites had been established by the UNITAF leadership for the purpose of ridding the countryside of crew-served weapons and vehicles. Additionally, General Aideed controlled a propaganda radio station known as Radio Mogadishu (also known as Radio MOG or Radio Aideed) that was co-located with AWSS #5. Aideed used Radio MOG for propaganda against the policies of UNOSOM II and the U.S. that conflicted with his vision for Somalia.

In mid-May, the Pakistanis were asked to submit plans on how Radio MOG could be stopped or controlled if the anti-UNOSOM II propaganda continued. A decision was made by UNOSOM II to inspect the site during routine inspection of the AWSSs. In the meantime, Aideed became aware of the discussions to shut down the radio. The above-mentioned report points out that Aideed and his followers in the Somalia National Alliance (SNA) "likened this approach to 'trusteeship' or 'colonization'".⁴²

Due to the risk involved in inspecting this particular site, the Pakistanis requested that the SNA either be notified ahead of time and wait for their response prior to entry, or conduct the inspection without notice. The inspection notice was delivered by Lt Colonel McGovern (UNOSOM Deputy Chief of Intelligence) at approximately 1700 hours on June 4 to General Aideed's residence in Mogadishu. The notice was acknowledged by a member of Aideed's security, who commented that "the SNA needed time to respond and

⁴² Ibid, p. 15.

that if UNOSOM insisted on conducting the inspections as planned that would lead to a war."⁴³

The U.N. inquiry report further states that:

After delivering the letter, Lt Colonel McGovern recorded the USC/SNA's objections to the inspection in a memorandum which was signed by Colonel Giuseppe Pirotti, the UNOSOM Chief of Intelligence. The memorandum was delivered by Lt Colonel McGovern to Major-General Thomas Montgomery, Deputy UNOSOM Force Commander and Commander of United States Joint Task Force (JTF). At the time, Maj.-General Montgomery was acting Force Commander in the absence of General Bir who was on leave.⁴⁴

On the morning of June 5, the Pakistani inspectors arrived simultaneously at five different AWSS in Southern Mogadishu. At AWSS #5, where Radio MOG was located, a crowd gathered as the Pakistanis inspected the site. Several Somali men were inciting the crowd against the inspectors and one man was shot when he attempted to grab a rifle from a Pakistani soldier. The inspection force at AWSS #5 was able to complete the inspection without further violence. Just as it withdrew, however, violence broke out when Pakistani forces were attacked at a nearby feeding point. This sparked a series of additional attacks aimed at traffic control points manned by Pakistanis, and ambushes on Pakistani forces moving toward the initial attacks. In all, twenty-four Pakistanis were killed, 57 injured, 6 captured, all whom

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 17.

were released the next day except for one who died in captivity. Additionally, one Italian and three U.S. soldiers were injured.⁴⁵

The United Nations Security Council reacted swiftly, passing Resolution 837 that authorized punitive actions against those responsible for the attacks. "Without investigation, blame for the attacks of 5 June was laid on the USC/SNA."⁴⁶

As significant as the attack was, Walter Clarke argues that the turning point of the operation that led to open conflict with Aideed was not the "5 June massacre" but a deliberate duping of the UN leadership by Aideed. On 13 May 1993, Aideed sent a letter to the UNOSOM II Headquarters requesting support for a conference to settle disputes between Aideed's Habr Gedir clan, dominant in the south central zones of Somalia, and the Mijertain clan, which controlled substantial parts of the northeast region of the country. As Clarke points out, this was attractive to the relatively inexperienced UNOSOM II leadership because it was a good sign that the "warlords" were recognizing the U.N.'s authority and role in the reconstruction of the Somali state. But within a week, Aideed began quarreling with UNOSOM II officials over the rules of the conference. The UNOSOM II conference never got underway. Aideed's supporters actually stole the tables and chairs from the proposed location and he sponsored his own conference that moved from place to place ostensibly to

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp. 17-18.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 19.

keep the UNOSOM II facilitator out of the process. Aideed's conference concluded on June 4, the day prior to the Somali attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers.⁴⁷

Admiral Howe's actions after UNSCR 837 were to immediately issue a \$25,000 reward for Aideed's arrest and to begin his requests for a U.S. team to capture the "warlord". UNOSOM II leadership and the U.S. chose a military solution at this point and would not attempt a political solution again until after the 03 October battle. Essentially there was no carrot offered to Aideed and without a carrot you do not have a coercive diplomacy strategy.

1. Recreating the State

Are these examples of coercive diplomacy? Yes, but were they used in an attempt to recreate the Somali state? Once again, the answer is yes with some qualification for the UNITAF phase of the operation. Formally, the mandate for fostering national reconciliation in Somalia was given to UNOSOM II in UN Security Council Resolution 814 on 26 March, 1993 which authorized UNOSOM II, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the reestablishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country...and to create conditions under which Somali civil society may have

⁴⁷Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve," pp. 50-53.

a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation....⁴⁸ From this moment on, there could be no doubt as to the objectives of the UNOSOM II leadership. Even though in July 1993 the Clinton administration continued to downplay U.S. involvement in the reconstruction efforts in Somalia, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright stated that the U.S. was "prepared to stay the course....We believe that the mission of feeding the people and restoring Somalia is a very important one."⁴⁹ She added, "We do all believe that it is important to capture Aideed, but what is most important is to be able to get back to restoring the law and order and building what is really a failed state."⁵⁰

UNOSOM II's objectives were obviously based upon the UN Security Council Resolution mandates, but did the earlier and less inspired UNITAF mission attempt to recreate the Somali state? It definitely took some important first steps toward political reconciliation.⁵¹ Ambassador Robert Oakley wasted little time in beginning a process of reconciliation with the various faction leaders prior to the U.S. troop arrival. Although he has defended his actions as necessary for the security of U.S. forces, Washington Post columnist Keith Richburg contends that Oakley's actions in December, 1993 were evidence of

⁴⁸Hirsch & Oakley, pp. 199-201.

⁴⁹Madeline Albright, "Interview with CNN correspondent Judy Woodruff," *CNN Transcripts*, 15 July, 1993.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Woods, p. 155.

the first indications of "mission creep".⁵² Indeed, Oakley's long time friend and co-worker in Somalia, John Hirsch, points that out, "Oakley and Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, with encouragement from Washington and CENTCOM, also saw the international presence as an unofficial umbrella under which Somalis could perhaps begin to sort out their political future after twenty-one years under Siad Barre's rule...."⁵³

American political officers working for Oakley organized meetings in the various Somali towns to prepare the people for arrival of the U.S. troops. These meetings became important sessions for local organization planning to start local councils. As pointed out earlier, Oakley "twisted the arms" of Aideed and Ali Mahdi to ensure their presence at the Addis Ababa conferences. Jeffrey Clark asserts that the political conferences in Addis Ababa in late January and again in March 1993 are evidence that the U.S. was involved in a state reconciliation process. Additionally, he points out that the U.S. avoided direct participation in the Addis Ababa conferences as not to establish expectations for an official American role in the political restructuring of Somalia, despite the major de facto role in just such a process.⁵⁴

⁵²Keith B. Richburg, "Broader U.S. Role Developing in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, December 31, 1992, p. 1/16. Richburg provided the most comprehensive, cogent and timely media coverage of the U.S. intervention in Somalia. He contended in December 1992 that the U.S. operation was already expanded beyond the mission of opening relief corridors and moving food to starving people.

⁵³Hirsch & Oakley, p. xviii.

⁵⁴Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," in Lori Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 230-231.

Even though Bush administration officials continued to present the intervention as a solely humanitarian effort, Keith Richburg of the Washington Post quotes senior U.S. officials in December of 1992 as admitting this was only a political ploy. "Clearly you can't just come here and deliver some food and leave,"⁵⁵ said one U.S. official in Somalia. As much as the UNITAF leadership tried not to have their strategy labeled "nation-building", the situation in Somalia made it obvious that merely feeding the hungry, would not suffice to end the situation of starvation in Somalia.

Oakley and Lieutenant General Johnston (UNITAF Commander) may have realized that feeding the hungry without some political settlement among the factions was merely applying a band-aid to a festering sore. Without a modicum of political reconciliation and some semblance of the re-creation of infrastructure, the starvation would resume when the military troops that forced compliance left. Although not meant as an endorsement for U.S. "nation-building", U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone pointed this out in a now infamous memorandum.

In July 1992 Ambassador Hempstone sent a memorandum to the Under Secretary of State Frank Wisner after receiving a request for his input on the emerging situation in Somalia. In addition to his uncanny prediction of the Somali people's reaction and the military/political disaster for the U.S., his questions about what the U.S. was willing to sacrifice reflected a shrewd

⁵⁵Richburg, p. 1/16.

understanding of not only the American culture, but of the Somali's as well.

Commenting on U.S. plans for intervention, he wrote:

To what end? To keep tens of thousands of Somali kids from starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will starve to death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994)? Just how long are we prepared to remain in Somalia, and what are we prepared to do: Provide food, guard and distribute food, hunt guerrillas, establish a judicial system, form a police force, create an army, encourage the formation of political parties, hold free and fair multi-party elections?⁵⁶

As it turned out, those things are exactly what the U.S. and the U.N. attempted to do. Other than feeding the Somali population and the guerrillas that the U.S. would later have to fight, none of these tasks were carried out efficiently.

Apparently, the political and state restructuring efforts of UNITAF were quite obvious to those individuals tasked with carrying them out. Walter S. Clarke states that, "One of the arguments made by critics was that somehow the original humanitarian focus of the intervention had been diverted to "nation-building." Complaints about a change in the mission are unjustified. By its very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than simple humanitarian operations...it was clear that the successes of UNITAF would be judged not by how many people it helped to feed, but by the political situation it left behind."⁵⁷

⁵⁶Staff, "Think Three Times Before You Embrace the Somali Tarbaby," *U.S. News & World Report*, Vol.113, No. 23, December 13, 1992, p. 30.

⁵⁷Walter Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve," p. 42.

Indeed, it appears that most everyone agreed on the principle that long-term progress could not be achieved without political reconciliation. The U.S., however, did not want the responsibility that this long term solution implied. Ambassador Oakley argues that his diplomatic actions were simply carried out to ensure military expediency in achieving the humanitarian goals.⁵⁸ Indeed, as will be pointed out later in Chapter IV, Oakley was quite successful using coercive diplomacy to achieve compliance among the various militia leaders. His subtle ability to not getting tied down to a state restructuring agenda while establishing some of the pre-conditions for Somali state restructuring efforts is noteworthy.

Regardless of his intent, the political processes begun in UNITAF would have repercussions for UNOSOM II in that the "warlords" were accustomed to co-option by the U.S. leadership. Although the political processes begun by Oakley were not intended to force the re-creation of the Somali state on U.S. terms, the ease with which Oakley managed the militia leaders may have lulled the UNOSOM II leadership into thinking their expanded mandate would be just as easy. They were sadly mistaken.

⁵⁸ Hirsch & Oakley.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. USABLE MILITARY OPTIONS

Bruce Jentleson points out that, "The key military requisite of coercive diplomacy is that if force is used, it must be wielded in a controlled, discriminating manner.... Costs are to be inflicted on the adversary, but these should be of a type and magnitude geared more toward influencing his decision than to physically imposing one's will upon him."⁵⁹

There is a disproportionality between the objective of recreating a state and the limits on the military means to be used for the task.⁶⁰ During the UNITAF phase of the operation, the mere presence of decidedly overwhelming force in and of itself was normally enough to force the factions into compliance with U.N. and particularly Oakley's demands. When force was applied "UNITAF forces showed no hesitation in using *measured* force to destroy 'technicals' and illegal weapons caches."⁶¹

On 24 January, 1993 forces loyal to General Morgan (one of Aideed's rivals for control of Somalia) attacked forces loyal to General Aideed and led by Colonel Omar Jess. Jess was guarding his heavy weapons in a UNITAF designated AWSS in Kismayo. The local UNITAF commander, General

⁵⁹Bruce W. Jentleson, in Alexander A. George & William E. Simons (ed.), *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Second Edition, Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 176.

⁶⁰Ibid, p. 176. This concept adapted from Jentleson. He uses the same terminology applied to changing a government.

⁶¹Woods, p. 14. *Emphasis added.*

Magruder, attacked Morgan's forces and drove them back. They destroyed a number of technicals and artillery pieces but didn't pursue the forces any further than necessary to separate the combatants. UNITAF and U.S. Liaison Office Somalia (USLO) officials participated in talks with Morgan and became convinced that he was reasonable and would not attack Jess' forces again. But on the night of 22 February, some of Morgan's troops slipped into Kismayo dressed as herders and began attacking houses belonging to senior Jess and Aideed supporters. Jess and his militia fled Kismayo and looted Red Cross and NGO warehouses that they were paid to protect.⁶² After this, Oakley says that he and Johnston "issued an ultimatum to Morgan to withdraw to Doble at the Kenyan border and another to Jess to canton his men and arms at locations near Jilib."⁶³

Although both complied, Oakley contends that reports by British Broadcasting Company (BBC) and Reuters led Aideed supporters in Mogadishu to believe that Morgan had taken Kismayo with the tacit approval of the UNITAF forces. This sparked anti-UNITAF demonstrations in Mogadishu and violence erupted in Mogadishu in the form of attacks against Nigerian forces and angry demonstrations against the U.S. embassy.⁶⁴ After two days of consultation within UNITAF and the USLO and upon discussions with Aideed, Oakley and Zinni sent a private warning to Aideed that:

⁶²Hirsch & Oakley, pp. 76-77.

⁶³Ibid, p. 77.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

...he would personally be held accountable for any recurrence.
There were no further anti-UNITAF actions by the SNA.⁶⁵

This was a case of successfully using the threat of force to convince Aideed not to use violence against UNITAF.

The U.S. led UNITAF force had very limited objectives. The objective was not to *quickly* recreate the Somali state, but rather to ensure the distribution of food, the near termination of violence, and the beginnings of political reconciliation.

In contrast to UNITAF, UNOSOM II attempted to not only ensure the survival of the population, but to recreate the Somali state structure. Walter Clarke complains that UNITAF did not do enough to disarm and punish the "warlords." He asserts that "the UNITAF deployment provided the force necessary to impress the warlords but lacked the political objectives to cause them to back down."⁶⁶

The real problem, however, was not what UNITAF did not do, but rather that the U.S. supported the objectives of UNSCR 814 without the requisite support to U.S. forces during their participation in UNOSOM II. This became painfully obvious when confirmed reports that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin turned down General Montgomery's request for armor in September, 1993 became a matter of public debate.

⁶⁵Ibid, p. 79. The Somali National Alliance (SNA) was created by Aideed after the overthrow of Siad Barre. The obvious reference to Somali nationalism is an overstatement at best. As pointed out earlier in the text, the militia leaders were able to hold power by means of military force, not specific alliance to individuals.

⁶⁶Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p. 21.

In September 1993, U.S. Forces Commander, Major General Thomas Montgomery requested U.S. M-1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles due to the increased tempo and hazards of combat operations. Although this request was supported by Commander in Chief of Central Command, General Hoar and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, Secretary of Defense Aspin turned down the request. Aspin later took full responsibility for his decision and resigned from his post. The concerns over political perceptions as to the U.S. intentions in Somalia obscured the question of providing force protection that was requested by the military leaders.

Admiral Howe points this out in a scathing indictment of the Clinton administration's support for its troops; "The US, in effect, seemed to manage UN requests unintentionally on the margins, providing enough to keep operations going but not enough to ensure success.

The Clinton administration's fears of sending armored vehicles were based on the perception that this would send a wrong impression. It is hard to imagine what signal could be worse than the American public finding out that soldiers did not have the equipment deemed necessary by their commander in the field. Perhaps Secretary Aspin remembered the lessons from Vietnam that Armor has no place in a counter-insurgency conflict.

Edward Luttwak argues that Post-Cold War conflicts focused on quick results cause combatants to take risks which inevitably lead to casualties on all sides. The new form of warfare and new form of mentality would need to inject unheroic realism into military means and require not only a patient disposition,

but also a modest one. This disposition would foster objectives that would permit partial effects, when doing more would be too costly in U.S. lives and doing nothing too damaging to world order and U.S. self-respect.⁶⁷ Indeed, Larry Cable offers that this new strategy be based on presence, patience, and persistence, rather than the Vietnam era strategy of find, fix and destroy.⁶⁸

The August 1993 deployment of Task Force Ranger is an example of such risk taking. Rather than maintaining a large force for a long time, or exercising constant and persistent coercive force against Aideed's faction, the U.S. attempted to go for the quick, single surgical strike win. The idea of a "pristine" environment may have been fostered by the footage of Desert Storm bombing footage. But the urban environment of Mogadishu offers no such "pristine" place to fight. The vicious fire-fight on October 3-4, 1993 dissolved this perception and broke the American political will. Having played the politically high risk card, the Clinton administration chose the neo-Vietnam option of declaring victory and going home.

B. ASYMMETRY OF MOTIVATION

Alexander George emphasizes that motivation of the actors influences the outcome of a coercive diplomacy strategy. "The likelihood of successful coercion is greater if one side is more strongly motivated by what is at stake

⁶⁷Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, #3, Vol. 74, May/June, 1995, pp. 110-122.

⁶⁸Larry Cable, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 02 February 1995.

than its opponent, and, particularly, if its opponent is aware of this."⁶⁹ During UNITAF, the motivation appeared to be equal among both the U.N. and the faction leaders. As the more intrusive UNOSOM II phase began, the U.S. and the U.N. became disadvantaged, this time by what Jentleson calls an "unfavorable asymmetry of motivation" for both the U.S. and the U.N.⁷⁰

The U.S. was motivated by two considerations: to succeed in Somalia for obvious humanitarian reasons, but there was also another and perhaps more important one. In the wake of the Cold War, the U.S. (and certainly Clinton) was especially interested in ensuring that the "new world order" could be controlled with a hefty dose of multi-lateralism.⁷¹ The dream of multi-lateralism, however, would soon suffer a substantial blow.⁷²

For the faction leaders, there was a much more important motivating factor: survival. Once the false Somali Cold War economy totally disintegrated, the Somali infrastructure collapsed. With scarce resources, the traditional clan structures resurfaced to some degree.⁷³ Food became power

⁶⁹George, Hall & Simons, p. 219.

⁷⁰Jentleson in George & Simons, p. 189.

⁷¹Hirsch & Oakley, p. 151. Oakley believes that Somalia served as an experiment in multi-lateral interventions in "failed states." He refers to candidate Clinton's pre-election speeches whereby he touts the concepts of "multi-lateralism." See also Thomas G. Weiss, "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome: Operation Rekindle Hope," *Global Governance*, 1:2, Spring 1995.

⁷² Jonathan Clark, "Rhetoric Before Reality: Loose Lips Sink Ships," *Foreign Affairs*, #5, Vol. 74, September/October, 1995, p. 2-7.

⁷³Helen Chapin Metz, (ed.), *Somalia: A Country Study*, Washington, Library of Congress, 1993, p. 163. Former President Siad Barre outlawed clans after coming to power in 1969. The real power in Somalia was controlled in Mogadishu where the various forms of aid came through. Although clans were outlawed, structures remained, in fact Barre's clan became the most powerful due to his policy of granting high-paying government jobs to his clan members.

and power was vested in the "warlords". The "warlords", especially in Mogadishu, assumed the helm of their particular faction and were de facto in charge of their respective clan or sub-clan.

Ken Menkhaus points out:

...the peace process in Somalia was under constant threat from a sizable "conflict constituency" which had vested interests in continued instability. These interests included and continue to include, those who profit from an economy of plunder, mafia-like extortion rackets, and various other unlawful economic dealings; militia leaders whose power base rests on conquest and fear.⁷⁴

1. Mission Creep And Asymmetry of Motivation

A by-product of the "mission creep" that occurred in Somalia was an asymmetry of motivation that favored the faction leaders over both U.N. and U.S. leaders. The objectives that UNOSOM II pursued threatened the power that the various faction leaders enjoyed. While the risks to the faction leaders increased dramatically, thus increasing their motivation, there was not a corresponding increase in the motivation of the U.N. and U.S. leaders.

Walter Clarke believes that the clans offered a system of survival for the Somali "warlords". He points out that Aideed's Habr Gedr sub-clan was his "center of gravity" and would have him as their leader only as long as he protected them and ensured they had food.⁷⁵ With this atmosphere,

⁷⁴Ken Menkhaus, "The Reconciliation Process in Somalia: A Requiem," Draft Paper presented at Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995, p. 21.

⁷⁵Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve," p. 54.

maintaining power in the face of U.S. and U.N. intervention became all or nothing for Aideed *and* his faction.

Oakley's diplomatic strategy to ensure aid arrived where it was needed provided an impetus for Aideed and other faction leaders to capitulate. This so called "top-down"⁷⁶ process virtually ensured that the "warlords" would maintain their power (at least for a time). UNITAF was able to co-opt Aideed and other faction leaders because their power was not threatened to the degree they would experience during UNOSOM II. Oakley ensured that the faction leaders understood what UNITAF was there to accomplish, "The message was clear--you can keep your weapons and your status as militia leaders intact, in exchange for allowing our troops to pursue the humanitarian aspects of the operation unimpeded."⁷⁷ This process of diplomacy will be studied further in the next section.

Additionally, the massive food distribution campaign conducted by UNITAF and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had all but stopped the necessity for roving bands to steal food for survival. Not that it was not still taking place, but the effort at attaining sustenance was no longer a primary motivator for the bandits or the "warlords". James Woods sums up this aspect, "Suffice it to say that within 90 days UNITAF had accomplished its mandate

⁷⁶ Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995. During this conference, the UNITAF approach to reconciliation was generally referred to as a "top-down" approach referring to the method of involving the faction leaders who controlled the power, over the general Somali population. The UNOSOM II approach was generally regarded as a different approach from UNITAF. This approach relied on a more traditional Somali cultural process of clan council based elders, regional systems and women. It should be noted that women did not play a part in traditional clan councils.

⁷⁷Richburg, "Relation With the Warlords," p. 5.

and was ready to withdraw. Within that time, the famine in Somalia had been brought under control, a measure of tranquility restored, and some important first steps taken to start the process of reconciliation."⁷⁸

How did the asymmetry of motivation become unfavorable for the U.S.? The UNOSOM II leadership took a decidedly different approach in their political reconciliation efforts. Their approach has come to be known as the "bottom-up" approach.⁷⁹ UNOSOM II's focus was on recreating the Somali state based on district and regional councils. These district and regional councils had the effect of reducing Aideed's power and were "a serious institutional obstacle to Aideed's long term ambitions."⁸⁰

With the increasing pressure UNOSOM II was applying on Aideed, he became more, rather than less powerful. A report from *Human Rights Watch: Africa* contends that Aideed intentionally began fighting with U.N. and U.S. forces specifically because it increased his following and served to unite many Somalis against the U.N.⁸¹ Ambassador Oakley suggests that Aideed became a martyr, growing more powerful each time the U.S. and U.N. engaged him militarily, "Aideed began to take on an almost mythological stature, even among Somalis who did not care for or support him, through his appeal to powerful

⁷⁸Woods, p. 155.

⁷⁹Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995.

⁸⁰Hirsch & Oakley, p. 135.

⁸¹ *Human Rights Watch: Africa*, April, 1995, p. 68.

traditional and nationalist identifications."⁸² He contends that after the U.S. began its attacks on Aideed, the SNA became better organized and began receiving support from the different clans across Somalia.⁸³

For Aideed, the conflict had become one of survival in the sense that his continued existence depended upon his ability to avoid capture or forced power sharing with other Somali leaders. His ability to arouse the spirits of the Somalis in Mogadishu against the "neocolonialist" Americans served to create a dangerous situation for the U.N. and U.S. forces.

C. BASIS FOR DIPLOMACY

George states that:

To employ coercive diplomacy successfully,..., one must find a combination of carrot and stick that will suffice to overcome the opponent's disinclination to grant what is being asked of him.⁸⁴

The opponent in this case were the faction leaders, above all Aideed. During UNOSOM II, he was being asked to relinquish power. The power that he possessed, as pointed out earlier, represented survival for Aideed.

Jentleson points out, "It is hard to imagine what kind of carrot could overcome the zero-sum nature of such stakes."⁸⁵ His reference was to changing

⁸²Hirsch & Oakley, p. 123.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴George, Hall & Simons, p. 243.

⁸⁵Jentleson in George & Simons, p. 178.

an opponent's government, but as advanced in the previous section, power in Somalia became the faction leaders primary motivation.

The combination of carrots and sticks was initially effective during UNITAF and totally lost importance immediately prior to and during UNOSOM II. What defined the basis of diplomacy during each of these distinct operations?

The basis for diplomacy was not so much a function of the pre-conditions as established by their particular mandates. It was more so a function of the goals established by the leadership of the individuals placed in charge of operations for the U.S. and the U.N. in Somalia.

Initially, Ambassador Oakley's combination of carrots and sticks allowed for the open discourse with the various faction leaders in Somalia. Although it is true that there are few carrots in this situation, Oakley appears to have understood the significance of the available diplomatic options. The carrots for Somalia in general was allowing UNITAF and UNOSOM II to operate freely. This would, in theory, return order to civil society and end mass starvation. As Ambassador Oakley points out, "The keen Somali interest in international material assistance was a significant incentive for at least a degree of cooperation."⁸⁶ Oakley saw the importance that playing to the "warlords" prestige would bring to the process during initial talks in December, 1992. He states, "As far as possible, the goal would be achieved by dialogue and co-

⁸⁶Hirsch & Oakley, p. 57.

option, using the implicit threat of coercion to encourage the faction leaders to gain prestige by showing leadership at home and to the international community."⁸⁷ This is a clear indicator that Oakley was maintaining both options open. He further states that UNITAF would not "pick a winner,"⁸⁸ and "would try hard not to play favorites."⁸⁹ Even though Aideed accused UNITAF and Oakley of plotting against him after the Kismayo incident in January, Oakley was able to maintain a dialogue with Aideed *and* the other faction leaders.⁹⁰

As pointed out in the previous section on asymmetry of motivation, the militia leaders were able to keep their weapons as long as they did not use them against UNITAF or each other. However, UNITAF always maintained the stick if any militia forces should get out of line. Keith Richburg points this out, "There was of course the explicit threat of the use of force, that attacks on the U.S. troops would be responded to massively, and that was demonstrated early on in the operation when U.S. helicopters destroyed an Aideed cantonment site that was known to house snipers."⁹¹

It should be pointed out that there are many critics of Oakley's strategy of negotiating with the "warlords". Many of the leaders of UNOSOM II would

⁸⁷Hirsch & Oakley, p. 56.

⁸⁸Hirsch & Oakley, p. 156.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid, pp. 155-157.

⁹¹Richburg, "Relation With the Warlords," p. 5.

later criticize Oakley's strategy of negotiation as strengthening the "warlords" hand and legitimating their power in the eyes of other Somalis.⁹² This criticism is accurate when viewed from the perspective of the expanded mandates of UNOSOM II. But the UNITAF mandate was defined by the narrow mission as defined by the Bush administration, that of humanitarian aid. The political pressure in Washington to limit U.S. casualties and not conduct "nation-building" drove Oakley's actions.⁹³ The bottom line for UNITAF is that Oakley's diplomatic tactics appeared to have worked in coercing support or at least tolerance from Aideed.

Oakley would not play a personal role in the Addis Ababa conference in March; it is apparent, though, that he encouraged if not coerced Aideed and the other faction leaders to participate. "The U.S. avoided direct participation in the Addis Ababa conference so as not to establish expectations for an official American role in the political restructuring of Somalia, despite the major de facto role in just such a process."⁹⁴ The Addis Ababa Reconciliation Conference laid the groundwork for a long-term political solution for Somalia. The agreement created a seventy-four-member Transitional National Council (TNC) based on regional structures that would eventually lead to a national

⁹²Critics include Admiral Howe, Robert Gosende from the United States Liaison Office/Somalia, Keith Richburg from the Washington Post, and of course Walter Clarke. Each voiced this criticism at the Princeton Conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995.

⁹³Walter S. Clarke, *Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*, Carlisle Barracks, Center for Strategic Leadership, 1995. In this book Clarke has compiled a list of 2000 books and articles. He comments on many of the issues brought up by the authors and is critical of UNITAF and Oakley's strategies in this compilation.

⁹⁴Clark, pp. 230-231.

government. The problem of implementation was left unsolved however. The reconciliation agreements that were reached in Addis Ababa, highly touted at the time, would never bear fruit.

James Woods asserts that UNOSOM II strangely ignored the promising agreements set forth in Addis Ababa due to the preoccupation with the hunt for Aideed after the June 5 attack on the Pakistani forces.⁹⁵ Ambassador Oakley believes that these regional structures were eventually seen by Aideed as contrary to his legitimate position of power. After all, Aideed had been one of the leaders who had been most responsible for the defeat of the Siad Barre regime. The belief that the overthrow of Barre was a populist revolution was not lost on Aideed.⁹⁶

The Addis Ababa conference may have confirmed to Aideed and his faction what they suspected all along; the U.N. (fully supported by the U.S.) was attempting to "marginalize their influence, or cut them out of Somalia's future political equation by padding the deck, so to speak, with women's groups, elders, intellectuals, Moslem clerics and traditional leaders."⁹⁷

Because of this, some believe that Aideed may have intentionally provoked the U.N. in order to maintain his power base with his clan and

⁹⁵Woods, p. 19.

⁹⁶Hirsch & Oakley, p. 135.

⁹⁷Richburg, "Relation With the Warlords," p. 6.

faction.⁹⁸ Whatever the reason he ordered the attack (if he did), there was soon to be a drastic change in the nature of the situation in Mogadishu.

On 6 June, UN Security Council Resolution 837 was passed. The resolution called for the capture of "those responsible" for the Pakistani deaths.⁹⁹ Ambassador Howe's strategy was to offer a \$25,000 reward for Aideed's arrest and he began to petition his contacts in Washington for what would eventually lead to the deployment of Task Force Ranger in late August.¹⁰⁰ On June 12, UNOSOM II forces led by U.S. AC-130 and Cobra gunships, attacked Aideed's weapons compound in downtown Mogadishu. On June 17, Aideed's forces killed 5 more U.N. soldiers; on June 27-28, 2 more U.N. troops died; on July 3, 3 more; and on July 7, 6 Somali U.N. employees were killed. On July 12, the U.N., led by soldiers from the U.S. 10th Mountain Division attacked Aideed's main compound.¹⁰¹ No longer could these military actions be explained as exemplary in nature as required for effective coercive diplomacy. "In effect, and regrettably for the operation and for Somalia, UNOSOM and Aideed were now at war."¹⁰²

It is important to note that Admiral Howe did make a last ditch effort at diplomacy with Aideed prior to the June 5 attack (see section on Recreating

⁹⁸*Human Rights Watch: Africa*, p. 68.

⁹⁹Hirsch & Oakley, p. 209.

¹⁰⁰Woods, p. 20.

¹⁰¹*Ibid*, p. 19.

¹⁰²*Ibid*.

the Somali State by Coercive Diplomacy). However, it was apparent that Aideed felt no compulsion to negotiate with UNOSOM II.

1. A Two-track Strategy

Although I have contended that the June 5 battle between the Pakistanis and Somali militiamen ended the period of coercive diplomacy, it is important to look briefly at what became a two-track strategy. This strategy on one hand attempted to "cajole and assist the UN to energetically fulfill the broad mandate of UNOSOM II"¹⁰³ and on the other to capture Aideed. As pointed out earlier, the President himself would express surprise at this strategy and after the 3-4 October fire-fight said, "We have no interest in denying anybody access to playing a role in Somalia's political future."¹⁰⁴ This was a direct signal to Aideed that the U.S. was willing to include him in a political solution. However the signal came too late to influence Aideed's decision making during the critical period after he became the target of U.S. and U.N. forces. Although some in the administration embraced the two-track strategy, the President believed that diplomacy based on a political rather than military solution was being advanced.¹⁰⁵

Ambassador Oakley was sent back to Somalia after the October 3-4 battle, where he found himself attempting to alter the dynamics of the

¹⁰³Ibid, p. 20.

¹⁰⁴Thomas L. Friedman, "Somalia offers a Lesson for U.S.," *The New York Times*, 10 October, 1993, 5c.

¹⁰⁵ Drew, p. 325.

diplomatic situation back to where it was in March. As Oakley observed, the formula on regional councils decided upon by the Addis Ababa accords of March 1993, "was no longer regarded as inevitable."¹⁰⁶ Had the decision makers taken this stance earlier in the process, the deaths of American servicemen in late summer and fall of 1993 may have not occurred. Instead, the parents, wives, and children of killed American soldiers rebounded in horror as they learned of U.S. planes flying Aided to the latest peace talks.¹⁰⁷

The catalyst for this two-track strategy may have occurred when Aided wrote former President Jimmy Carter for help in averting an impending disaster in August of 1993. On 13 September, Carter and President Clinton discussed the Somalia situation and the letter. Sidney Blumenthal asserts that Carter came away convinced that President Clinton intended to rescind the order to capture Aided.¹⁰⁸ Instead, On 22 September, the U.S. fully supported UNSCR 865, which reaffirmed previous resolutions on Somalia. "By omitting any suggestion of a change in the policy of pursuing Aided, the Security Council effectively endorsed its continuation."¹⁰⁹ Here was a perfect chance for the Clinton administration to de-emphasize the hunt for Aided and pursue more stridently the peace process as set forth in the Addis Ababa accords. But as I

¹⁰⁶Hirsch & Oakley, p. 140.

¹⁰⁷Interview with LTC (Retired) Larry Joyce, 15 January, 1995. LTC Joyce is father of Ranger Sergeant Casey Joyce killed in action on 3 October, 1993.

¹⁰⁸Sidney Blumenthal, "Why Are We in Somalia?," *The New Yorker*, October 25, 1993, for an account of the Carter-Clinton discussion.

¹⁰⁹Hirsch & Oakley, p. 126.

have asserted, the U.S. and U.N. leadership in Somalia was no longer in a negotiating mood and had defiantly jerked the carrot from in front of Aideed.

D. CLARITY OF AMERICAN AND UN OBJECTIVES

George states that "Clarity as to the objective, while perhaps not always essential, may be necessary in some situations if limited force is to be applied effectively on behalf of the strategy of coercive diplomacy."¹¹⁰ How important is it to have clear objectives in coercive diplomacy? Almost everyone agrees that precise objectives are essential for successful diplomacy. However, most everyone also agrees that the objectives are much harder to define. In the business of recreating failed states, Colonel Ken Allard offers some advice:

Clear UN mandates are critical to the planning of the mission because they shape the basic political guidance given to U.S. forces by our National Command Authorities (NCA). A clear mandate shapes not only the mission (the what) that we perform but the way we carry it out (the how).¹¹¹

One thing is certain about Somalia, the U.N. leadership (*i.e.*, Boutros-Ghali) had very clear objectives in mind for Somalia but lacked the political power to achieve them during UNITAF and lacked the military power during UNOSOM II. Equally certain is that the U.S. began with clear policy objectives in UNITAF. However, as the operation moved from the "purely humanitarian" mission of UNITAF to the "nation-building" mandates of UNOSOM II, multiple

¹¹⁰George, Hall & Simons, p. 220.

¹¹¹Allard, p. 22.

and shifting policy objectives replaced the former coherent (if not very limited) U.S. objectives.

The real problem initially was not that the U.N. or U.S. had unclear objectives. The problem was that their objectives were not synchronized. The U.S. objectives for UNITAF reflected the strategy of then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell. The use of overwhelming force to achieve goals is the cornerstone of the Powell Doctrine. The U.S. carefully crafted U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 to suit their particular form of strategy.¹¹² The Theater Commander in Chief (CINC) of U.S. Central Command, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the National Command Authority crafted the end state for Operation Restore Hope.

The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-3 (FM 100-3) defines an "end state" as, "A set of required conditions which, when achieved, attain the aims set for the campaign or operation. The end state describes what the National Command Authority (NCA) and the combatant commander want the situation to look like when the operations conclude."¹¹³

The end state for Operation Restore Hope was:¹¹⁴

The end state desired is to create an environment in which the UN and the NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts.

¹¹²Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p. A-2.

¹¹³*Operation Restore Hope: Lessons Learned Report, 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993*, Leavenworth, Center For Army Lessons Learned, May 1993, p. I-14.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

Who would determine the successful accomplishment of the end state? The U.S., but the mandate was from the U.N. and it would be the U.N. that had to assume the mission. This sticking point was to be the first of many problems that would disable the U.N.'s overall strategy.

It has already been established that Boutros-Ghali wanted the U.S. to carry out general disarmament of the Somali population and that both Bush and Clinton denied this request. Walter Clarke pointed out what may have been wishful thinking on the part of Boutros-Ghali: that the U.S. would eventually capitulate to his demands and conduct the disarmament campaign.¹¹⁵

However, the U.S. was determined that its commitment would be short and that they would not get involved in disarming Somali gangs and militia members. The rhetoric Bush enunciated at the time also established a limited military operation in time and purpose. President-elect Bill Clinton agreed with the mission limits and criteria established by the Bush administration and did not announce any major policy shifts for U.S. commitments.¹¹⁶

This fact however did not later deter the Clinton administration from fully supporting the mandates as outlined in UNSCR 814 or 837. These mandates explicitly called for the recreation of the Somali state, "the US, however, did not change its goal of eliminating direct military support as soon as feasible."¹¹⁷ As Admiral Howe points out, "UNITAF appeared to measure its

¹¹⁵Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p.16.

¹¹⁶Walter S. Clarke, *Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*, p. 39.

¹¹⁷Howe, p. 8.

success by the timeliness of its withdrawal; UNOSOM worried about maintaining continuity in the near term and the much broader two year commitment ahead."¹¹⁸

The decision to fully support the expanded mandate without an equally expanded commitment of armed forces demonstrates a lack of clarity as to the objective. Indeed, just as the U.S. was pulling out its overwhelming force contingent of UNITAF, the U.N. was assuming the expanded military mission with a much less capable force of ad hoc coalitions. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration continued to deny that the U.S. mission had changed. Caught in the middle were the soldiers from 10th Mountain Division and the forces from the other nations involved. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of the 10th were initially responsible only for emergency situations in which other U.N. forces might find themselves while carrying out U.N.-directed patrols and missions. But the real truth was evident when this force became engaged in combat operations, by attacking Aideed's compound in July. This use of U.S. military forces should have been seen as likely due to the lack of equipment and trained military forces from the U.N. contingents. Only the U.S. forces had the training and equipment required to substantially influence the balance of power in Mogadishu. With the expanded mandate, the U.N. leaders turned to their only viable options, the Americans.

¹¹⁸Ibid, p. 11.

The U.S. insistence (albeit understandable) that U.S. combat forces not fall under U.N. command caused an equally understandable consternation among the other coalition members. If the United States would not conduct disarmament of the population, why should the Pakistanis or the Egyptians. In fact, Howe points out that all U.S. military operations had to be approved at the highest levels back in Washington.¹¹⁹ This fact leads one to the inevitable question. If the U.S. and U.N. had different objectives and there was no clear command channel for all forces in Somalia, how could anyone expect military and political goals to merge?

What did this lack of clarity of objective lead to? War with Aideed's faction. Walter Clarke contends that Aideed realized that the U.S. would soon leave Mogadishu and leave the security of the city to a much less capable force. Therefore, he reluctantly agreed to the Addis Ababa accords to speed the Americans on their way so that he could take on the less capable U.N. forces.¹²⁰ Whether this was a preconceived strategy of Aideed's is debatable. However, it is clear that there were increased verbal and military attacks on U.N. forces on the heels of the UNITAF departure.¹²¹

The U.N.'s and U.S.' opposing objectives created confusion among the U.S. leadership. Secretary of State Christopher sent Boutros-Ghali a letter from

¹¹⁹Ibid, p. 23.

¹²⁰Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates."

¹²¹ See Chapter III, Section B, for description of events concerning the June 5 attack on the Pakistani forces.

the administration on 20 September, 1993. The letter stressed to Boutros-Ghali the importance of a political reconciliation effort and the withdrawal of U.S. forces as quickly as possible. In his reply, Boutros-Ghali was even more adamant about his mandate to capture Aideed.¹²² As Clinton and Christopher pushed Boutros-Ghali for a diplomatic solution with Aideed, Howe and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeline Albright were referring to Aideed as a "terrorist."¹²³ The reference to Aideed as a terrorist, while obviously used as a tactic to inflame the public perception against Aideed, has wider implications for policy. By referring to Aideed as a terrorist, these senior administration personnel put constraints on how the president can react. The traditional U.S. position of not negotiating with terrorists limits the president's options if he acknowledges the senior officials comments as valid. Because of the inflammatory rhetoric used against Aideed up to this point may explain why the president did not heed the advice of former President Carter.

Secretary of Defence Aspin attempted to calm fears of escalation due to the Ranger Task Force deployment saying that "unless we return security to south Mogadishu, political chaos will follow any U.N. withdrawal."¹²⁴ After being in country for one day, the deployment of Task Force Ranger and their

¹²²Elaine Sciolino, "U.N. Chief Warning U.S. Against Pullout of Force in Somalia," *The New York Times*, October 1, 1993, p. 1-A.

¹²³Keith Richburg, "UN Helicopter Assault in Somalia Targeted Aideed's Top Commanders," *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1993, p. A1.

¹²⁴John Lancaster, "Aspin Lists U.S. Goals in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, August 28, 1993, p. A1.

mission was leaked to the press.¹²⁵ Clearly there was confusion about the goals of the U.S. among the policy makers in Washington.

It appears that the U.S. was caught in a political situation where fully supporting the U.N. objectives in early 1993 was too risky domestically.¹²⁶ But having trumpeted the multi-lateral and enlargement horn during his campaign¹²⁷, and to back up this rhetoric, President Clinton threw the barking Boutros-Ghali a bone in the form of the American QRF and sent Ambassador Howe to hold his leash.

The "subsequent twists and turns in American policy were difficult for the UN to absorb."¹²⁸ The failure of the U.N. to adequately replace the American forces in the streets of Mogadishu created a security situation that would quickly lead to a dangerous situation in Mogadishu. The U.S. and other UNOSOM II forces seemed to take on a "bunker" mentality after UNITAF left. Street patrols in Mogadishu became much less frequent. Forces remained behind the protection of barbed wire and fortifications, departing only for necessary trips to other U.N. facilities. Even then, new routes were created that

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Ann Devroy, "Collapse of U.S. Collective Action May Force Second Look at Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, 8 October, 1993, p. A24.

¹²⁷ See candidate Bill Clinton's "A New Covenant for American Security" speech delivered at Georgetown University on December 12, 1991.

¹²⁸Howe, p. 29.

circumvented the city streets. Meanwhile the flow of weapons into the city increased and Aideed's faction grew stronger.¹²⁹

This was a direct result of the U.N. and the U.S. not having mutually supporting political objectives that could be turned into a cogent military strategy. There just was not time for the U.N. to replace the American forces. Aideed may have understood the dynamics of this situation when he decided to up the ante by attacking the Pakistani's in June.¹³⁰

E. DOMESTIC SUPPORT

The debates that raged in Congress after the October 3-4 battle were not indicative of the congressional support for the U.S. military presence in Somalia a scant 10 months earlier. Domestic political support was high for the U.S.-led humanitarian mission. "In the wake of sending humanitarian aid to Somalia, President Bush's approval rating went up to its highest levels since the Gulf War. His approval rating was 56% as he left office."¹³¹ President-elect Bill Clinton immediately endorsed the plan and it seemed that there was virtually no one against the humanitarian mission.¹³² Indeed, there seemed to be

¹²⁹The previous paragraph is based on my personal observations as a member of Task Force Ranger from 26 August, 1993 - 22 October, 1993. In my discussions with members of the 10th Mountain Division, I learned that routine patrols in the city were substantially fewer in number than during the early part of UNOSOM II and steadily decreased as time went by. There was a general feeling that downtown Mogadishu was unsafe and that patrolling was a very dangerous proposition.

¹³⁰Keith Richburg, "Aideed Exploited U.N.'s Failure to Prepare," *The Washington Post*, December 5, 1993, p. A1.

¹³¹Richard Benedetto, "Bush Approval Rating Up," *U.S.A. Today*, 14 Jan 1993, P. 8A.

¹³²Woods, p. 14.

continued support for the U.S. mission right up until the ambush of the Pakistani forces on June 5.

How then, if domestic support was not a problem, does this aspect of domestic support fit into the overall analytical methodology? Secondly, was domestic support a factor? The answer lies in the Clinton administration's perceptions of support for a policy that they were having a hard time articulating. As Clinton pushed for a quick departure of U.S. troops in March of 1993, it was obvious that his policy makers saw a collapse of support right around the corner.¹³³

In an effort to overcome the effects of this looming loss of support, the Clinton administration did two things. The first was to pull out most of the troops well before Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and Admiral Howe felt they should. The second was to be less than forthcoming with the American people about the roles of the remaining forces in Somalia. Actions by the Clinton administration were not so much effected by a *real change* in public support, but by pre-conceived notions about how public support *would be* effected by the U.S. involvement. Thomas Friedman points out that both the Bush and Clinton administrations "helped to produce the frenzy [in the wake of the 3-4

¹³³David T. Burbach, *Presidential Approval and The Use of Force*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense and Arms Control Studies Program Working Paper, May 1994. In this study of public approval for the use of force, Burbach studied 78 uses of force beginning in 1953 with deployment of U.S. troops to help secure Japan to the outbreak of the ground war during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. In his study, he found that action to restore order in foreign countries was consistently less popular than actions to protect Americans or to defend American allies. In particular he found that Americans approve of protecting other Americans, are fairly supportive of defending allies, are a bit skeptical about punishing nations into changing their policies, and the public is quite negative towards restoring order in countries when American lives are not at stake. Therefore, Somalia type interventions are at the bottom of the list.

October fire-fight] by not leveling with the American people from the start that humanitarian intervention and nation-building are high-risk endeavors."¹³⁴

On the contrary, Bush had achieved broad consensus during his administration by first gaining the public support necessary and then using overwhelming military force to meet his clear objectives. Bush had learned this lesson during the Reagan years and during the U.S. victory in the Gulf War. The Clinton administration failed to articulate an evolving strategy to the American people as the situation in Mogadishu moved toward open conflict. Neither was there a real explanation to congress about why the U.S. was conducting combat raids in Somalia.¹³⁵

Mark Thompson points to a sensitive after action report compiled by Pentagon Analyst Michelle Flournoy as evidence that the objectives were not stated clearly, "From the day U.S. troops swarmed ashore, neither the American people nor Congress really had a firm fix,...on the U.S. interests at stake, the objectives sought, our strategy for achieving them and the risks associated with intervention....unaware of the mission creep, the public was outraged when 18 U.S. soldiers died."¹³⁶

The administration had mislead the American people and the Congress, but at what price. That price was having to answer to the American people and Congress on the morning of October 4, 1993. After watching with disgust the

¹³⁴Friedman, p. 5c.

¹³⁵Hirsch & Oakley, p. 158.

¹³⁶Mark Thompson, "The Past as Prelude," *Time*, September 19, 1994, p. 27.

scene of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the people wanted answers. But administration fingers initially pointed to the U.N. or the U.S. military. Eventually, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin would bear the burden for the failure of U.S. policies.¹³⁷

There is one more element of domestic support that may have had a direct effect. Although not normally in the equation of calculating domestic support, it is one that bears analysis. Aideed was trained by the KGB during the early 1970s.¹³⁸ He also worked with Americans when the Soviets dropped their support for the Somalis in the late 1970s.¹³⁹ It is not surprising therefore that Aideed knew to specifically target U.S. domestic political support in an all out effort to overcome the U.S. political will. Ambassador Oakley feels that "There is no doubt that the militia leaders had studied not only Operation Desert Storm but Vietnam and Lebanon to understand the domestic political impact of American casualties."¹⁴⁰ Keith Richburg quotes a senior aide to Aideed as saying that Aideed "made a calculated decision to kill American soldiers,"¹⁴¹ and that after the assault against Aideed's compound in July, "there

¹³⁷Secretary Aspin resigned in December, 1993.

¹³⁸John M. Collins, "Somalia: U.S./U.N. Military Options and Enemy Ripostes," *CRS Report for Congress*, October 14, 1993, p. 9.

¹³⁹*Ibid*, p. 10.

¹⁴⁰Hirsch & Oakley, p. 122.

¹⁴¹Keith Richburg, "In War on Aideed, UN Battled Itself," *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1993, p. A1.

was no more United Nations, only Americans. If you could kill Americans, it would start problems in America directly."¹⁴²

The problem of possible American casualties is becoming an increasingly difficult psychological post-Cold War phenomenon. Edward Luttwak argues that U.S. citizens are not prepared to accept casualties as readily as in the past. He asserts that Americans do not perceive the problems of post-Cold War diplomacy to be as vital to U.S. security as the limited wars fought during the Cold War.¹⁴³ Thomas Friedman takes a different and somewhat hard line view: "Some Americans seem to have forgotten in recent years that you join the Army not just to get a GI loan."¹⁴⁴ Risks are inherent in military operations and one of the reasons that the military exists is to carry out the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. But whether it is right or wrong to participate in "humanitarian operations", "oil wars", or "wars against the forces of evil", U.S. leadership should be forthright with the American people about the risks involved when sending forces in harms way.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Luttwak, pp. 110-115.

¹⁴⁴Friedman, p. 5c.

V. CONCLUSION

The successes of United Task Force (UNITAF) and the subsequent failures of United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) suggest important lessons in the uses of coercive diplomacy. The contrasts between the two operations offer an opportunity to analyze the divergent policies as they were applied to the same non-state actors.

As the United States and the United Nations search for solutions to the ever-increasing problem of collapsed states, Type "D" Coercive Diplomacy, as conducted by the leaders of UNITAF may offer a viable policy alternative. UNITAF's stated objectives allowed them to satisfy those goals while actually reaching a bit beyond them, as evidenced by Ambassador Robert Oakley's use of coercive diplomacy in forcing faction leaders to the negotiating table. The U.S. and the U.N. were thus able to maintain their moral high ground of humanitarianism only, while additionally seeking a long-range solution to Somalia's problem. Yet UNITAF's goals were obtainable and morally just in the eyes of the supporting nations. If the goal is to simply stop the fighting, hunger, and lawlessness, it may be better to empower those with whom we do not necessarily agree, provided they have the capability to re-create order from within.

To succeed in state re-structuring efforts, the desire for quick results may have to be replaced with long term commitments of a military force totally capable of maintaining or, if necessary, restoring the peace. In addition, the

diplomatic process must be tailored to the cultural environment of the population concerned.

Clarity of objectives must be shaped by all major allies, and incorporated into the overall strategy of the countries involved in the intervention. The objectives and subsequently the policies that prevailed during UNITAF were definitely American ones. Although other nations participated, the U.S. leadership was responsible for carefully crafting the intervention objectives for the entire force. I do not advocate that the U.S. become responsible for leading all such interventions. But prior to allowing U.S. forces to become part of an international force, the U.S. has the responsibility to ensure that the stated objectives are obtainable and coalesce with their own. In Somalia, confusion over issues such as "nation building" and the role U.S. forces would play caused tremendous consternation between the U.S., the U.N. leadership, and the other U.N. forces.

The outpouring of domestic support for the U.S. mission to Somalia in December, 1992 began deteriorating slowly and totally fell apart after the October 3-4 battle. Neither the American people nor the U.S. Congress was kept apprised of the expanded mandates and increasing role of U.S. forces to enforce them. They were simply not prepared for the events of 3-4 October and the result was complete reversal of U.S. policy and the resignation of the Secretary of Defence.

A. POLICY CREATION

Pre-conditions for successful coercive diplomacy may be somewhat misleading. The decision to use coercive diplomacy may not be as simple as analyzing the situation as it exists at any one moment. Ambassador Robert Oakley and the UNITAF leadership showed great aptitude for creating conditions for success. Policy makers and executors of those policies may well be able to influence these conditions with their actions. However, if, after analyzing the situation and the diplomatic and military options available, and the majority of the conditions do not exist and can not be created, another strategy would probably be more viable.

Although all of the pre-conditions are important for success, Alexander George points out that the opponent's perceptions may be the most important ingredient that a policy maker must use to his advantage.¹⁴⁵ In the five conditions for success advanced in this study, asymmetry of motivation addresses the opponent's perception most thoroughly. As advanced in this thesis, and in agreement with George, an asymmetry of motivation favoring or at least equal to that of an opponent is necessary for success.

¹⁴⁵ George & Simons, p. 287.

APPENDIX. [PRE-CONDITIONS]

The following table represents the conclusions from my analysis as applied to the original George pre-conditions.

Conditions That Favor CD	UNITAF	UNOSOM II
Strong Motivation	+	-
Asymmetry of motivation favoring the U.S./U.N. ^A	+	-
Clarity of Objective	+	-
Sense of urgency to achieve the objective ^A	+	-
Adequate domestic political support	+	-
Usable military options	+	-
Opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation ^A	+	-
Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement	+	-

^AOpponent's perception.

"+" indicates the presence of the condition; "-" indicates that the condition was not present.

*Motivation appeared to be equal

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